Banning people from entering countries has become the flavour of the month. Two US citizens — hip-hop artist Chris Brown, for his record of domestic violence, and anti-abortion advocate Troy Newman (pictured), for his claim that killing the foetus is equivalent to murder and should be subject to similar penalties — were banned from entering Australia. Australian lawyers Greg Egan and Terence Lambert were banned from entering PNG, where they were to prepare a case against the prime minister.
Together these cases invite reflection on the principles and processes that ought govern the denial of visas.
My own opinions have been shaped by observing similar, though less effectual, acts of exclusion in the Catholic Church. In recent decades many bishops have banned local and overseas Catholics from speaking on church premises. The exclusion often followed complaints by vocal Catholic groups that the speakers held positions incompatible with Catholic orthodoxy, had been criticised by their own national bishops or were controversial. The process of exclusion was opaque, but the bannings were generally justified by the risk that Catholics would be confused about their faith.
This practice was often ineffective because the sponsoring groups simply moved the events off Catholic turf. In the long run it was also self-defeating to use power to exclude open discussion of controversial topics. This suggested that truth could be imposed by authority and need not be commended by reasoned reflection. The result was that people barracked for their own side, and dismissed opposing arguments as motivated by ideology rather than the search for truth. The civility of public discourse and unity between Catholics both suffered.
This experience provides the lens through which I look at the denial of visas on character grounds. I concede that both in church and state it will sometimes be right to exclude people. But unless the processes are transparent and the need clearly demonstrated, such exclusion has costly consequences for the life of the community.
It privileges power over reflection, betrays the fear that exposure to bad people and ideas will inevitably seduce people, and suggests that character is defined unchangeably by past behaviour. These are the assumptions of a fearful and harsh society.
In Australia people have increasingly been excluded by executive power without consideration of whether it is reasonable. Think of asylum seekers, people deported after criminal charges and people fighting with IS. These exclusions do not weigh the threat posed by the individuals concerned, nor the evidence that their disposition and behaviour have changed.
In this climate it is important that the reasons for denying entry to Australia should be principled and narrowly defined. The salient consideration is whether the person would damage Australian society by their presence or actions.
Such damage might be caused in many ways. People with continuing criminal connections in another nation might want to expand their activities into Australia. People with incendiary views on issues that divide Australian communities might provoke violence.
People who plotted sedition, violent revolution and the overthrow of the state might exclude themselves. Others might be excluded because they affront the moral bonds that link Australia to the civilised world. We might also think of people who committed monstrous deeds, such as war atrocities, from which immigrants have suffered, and people who deny the reality and effects of the Holocaust.
It is also important that the criteria for exclusion be interpreted narrowly, and that applicants should receive the benefit of the doubt. People should not be excluded simply because they hold repugnant views. We must also ask if they will advocate for these views, and whether their advocacy will foment divisions or violence.
Nor should people be excluded automatically because they have committed criminal actions. They must demonstrate a lack of repentance.
Finally, the process by which people are excluded needs to be transparent. The reasons need to be stated clearly, and the decision to be open to effective review.
These safeguards are important to prevent banning people being used as a weapon in Australian moral and political debate. It would be wrong to use the harm done to an individual by shaming and excluding as a means to endorse particular views of what are right ideas or acceptable behaviour. The power of government or of social media should not be used to close down moral reflection.
In the light of these reflections, what can be said of the most recent examples of banning?
In excluding the Australian lawyers, the PNG government appears flagrantly to have exercised its power in its self-interest.
In the other two cases strong arguments can be made for banning, but I have reservations about each. Chris Brown certainly acted criminally and repugnantly in beating his girlfriend. He is not coming to Australia, however, to defend this behaviour, nor is his presence likely to encourage it. And he claims to have changed his ways. So a solid argument also exists for giving him the benefit of the doubt.
Troy Newman uses high and polemical rhetoric, which will anger and distress many people. But it is not clear that his speaking in Australia would have encouraged criminal behaviour or violence. And there remains the suspicion that power has been used to foreclose an important ethical debate in our society, namely whether the rights of the woman to terminate the life of a foetus should trump other rights.
Andrew Hamilton is consulting editor of Eureka Street.