Last Tuesday Radio National's Fran Kelly interviewed Russell Rees, head of the Victorian Country Fire Authority (CFA), following the Interim Report of the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (VBRC). She had that morally righteous tone that journalists get when they want someone to confess and admit fault.
Rees had certainly taken a shellacking from Jack Rush QC, counsel assisting the VBRC, about his performance on Black Saturday when he gave evidence to the Commission.
Although he took his medicine from Rush, Rees certainly didn't cop it sweet from Kelly. He gave as good as he got and refused to accept blame.
He pointed out, for instance, that the CFA successfully suppressed an extremely dangerous fire on Black Saturday afternoon in Upper Fern Tree Gully, just below Mount Dandenong. If the fire had got onto the quite heavily populated mountain many would have been killed and tremendous environmental damage done.
He reminded Kelly that no one could have imagined a fire like Black Saturday. As the VBRC itself admitted, 'Reports referred to flames leaping 100 m into the air, generating heat so intense that aluminium road signs melted. The plume of fires created a convection effect that generated winds so strong that trees appeared to have been screwed from the ground.' Fire behavior was described as 'unique'.
While historically this is not entirely true, we have certainly entered a new era of fire in Australia. Never before have we seen such concentrated velocity, fire intensity and spotting occurring so far ahead of the main front. So Rees was right to refuse to accept the kind of generalised blame that is often projected onto public officials (or environmentalists) by some in the community.
That is not to say that the performance of the authorities was perfect or even adequate. There were many mistakes made and the VBRC points them out. The communication system was completely inadequate, and centralised fire control in Melbourne was simply unable to cope with such a fast-moving situation. Controllers were far behind reality on the ground. More authority has to be given to local fire-fighters in the field.
How to forewarn the public is another problem. The VBRC heard that the maximum number on the McArthur Forest Fire Danger Index is 100. Over 50 is considered 'extreme'. On 7 February it reached 'previously unrecorded levels ranging from 120 to 180'. It is hard to convey to people something that has never been experienced before.
The VBRC makes a number of recommendations, but warning the public about impending danger is a devilishly difficult thing to get right. Somehow you have to find the balance between panic and disinterest.
On the 'stay or go' policy the VBRC wisely warns that recently 'there has been insufficient emphasis on the risks of staying and defending'. Only those who are properly prepared and strong in body and mind should stay behind to defend a residence.
But making a decision about this presupposes that ample warning has been or even can be given. With fast-moving, unpredictable fires that is not always possible. The last thing you need is a panic evacuation. The VBRC wisely notes that properties need to be assessed well in advance, but that people should not be forced to relocate.
Nevertheless some properties are indefensible and this needs to be acknowledged. Where defense is possible, 'not all houses are defensible in all situations, and contingencies need to be considered in case the plan to stay and defend fails'. All this illustrates the difficulty of generalising. A number of variables need to be taken into consideration in making decisions about staying or going and the VBRC correctly refuses to make binding rules for people.
As a fall-back position the VBRC calls for designated local community fire refuge areas to which people can retreat when all else fails. But even this is not as simple as it sounds. It would and did work in the compact town of Marysville, but it wouldn't work in Kinglake, strung out as it is along a ten kilometre-long escarpment with a single road running along the top. People might well have to go through the fire to get to a refuge.
Interestingly the VBRC makes no comment about preventative burning. This is mantra that is enunciated by a certain element in the community after every fire, but the simple fact is that all the preventative burning in the world would not have stopped the Black Saturday fire or even lessened its intensity.
The aim of this interim report is to make recommendations that can be implemented for the 2009–2010 fire season. The commissioners avoid what might be called the 'bigger fire questions'. But in the end these will have to be faced, especially as the impact of global warming hits us.
A new edition of Paul Collins' book Burn comes out next month from Scribe Publications.