One would think after the disastrous interventions in Iraq and Libya that Australians would have learned to be just a little bit suspicious when the US Government suggests another Middle East war, or when a politician urges – as Bob Carr and Tony Blair have – that we have a 'moral obligation' to join in.
Traditional just war theory says that there are a number of ethical questions raised in going to war. Is it for a just cause? Is war a last resort? Is it declared by proper authority? Is the war proportional to the end and does it have a reasonable chance of success? All of these have some echo in international law and all are decidedly murky here.
We are not clear on the cause. The war in Iraq in which Australia is currently engaged is reasonably clear-cut. Troops are there at the Iraqi Government’s invitation to fight ISIS – a war of self-defence. Australia has, however, ceased to recognise the Syrian Government.
The US supports some of the rebel groups in Syria (some of whom are fighting each other, ISIS and/or the Syrian Government at the same time). Another US ally – Turkey – is bombing both ISIS and the Kurds (who are successfully fighting ISIS). Australia is opposed to ISIS, but so are the Syrian Government and Al Nusra (the local Al Qaeda branch). Australia is opposed to the Syrian Government, but so are ISIS and Al Nusra. Which, if any of these, will Australia be supporting and why?
Certainly, for all the rhetoric, there is to date no evidence that any of these factions are massing troops to invade Australia (or even the US). Given that we cannot even say for certain who the enemy is or why we will fight, the question of whether any war is truly a matter of last resort must be equally open.
The position is complicated further by the fact that the chaos in Iraq which bred ISIS – usually thought of as our main potential target – was undoubtedly caused by the defeat of Saddam Hussain. In addition, a recently declassified 2012 memorandum from the US Defence Intelligence Agency, declares that 'there is the possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist principality in Eastern Syria…and this is exactly what the supporting powers to the [Syrian] opposition want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime…' This proved amazingly prescient in predicting both the place and the nature of ISIS, a self-declared Sunni caliphate claiming to base itself on the teaching of Muhammad and his companions ('the forefathers' – al salaf).
This report also suggests that the rise of the 'Salafist principality' was not exactly opposed by the US but seen as useful in counteracting the Shi’a powers of Iran, Iraq and Syria. It is therefore not beyond the realms of possibility that ISIS itself (now much vilified in the Western press and surely a major candidate for US bombing) is itself the result of a US experiment gone bad. What more havoc could an unfocused and badly thought-through intervention cause?
Then there is the question of proper authority. Australia and the US are certainly able to take military action in self-defence. This, however, does not seem to be the case here (for reasons already discussed). Failing that, 'lawful authority' is generally seen (at least in international law) to rest with the United Nations Security Council which, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, can mandate the use of force in preserving international order. Aside from the difficulty in taking action in a foreign country which is opposed by the government of that country, there is the complication that the Syrian government is supported by a number of countries – most notably Russia, a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council.
Russian fears might be allayed by some guarantee by America that the campaign was not aimed at the Syrian Government. Given, however, that the US did try to start a bombing campaign against the Syrian Government two years ago and given also that the UN resolution allowing a no-fly zone in Libya was used as cover for a full-scale invasion of Libya (which has not turned out well), one could understand why the Russians might not be entirely convinced. This is especially true given the fact that the United States and Australia are locked in a confrontation with Russia over the deteriorating situation in the Ukraine.
For all the above reasons, one must also be equally agnostic about the proportionality of war to the ends (which themselves are unknown). The same is true of the question of the chance of success. After all, if we do not know who we are fighting, why and what we hope to get out of it, success is remarkably difficult to define. For this, if for no other reason, the US and its allies should think carefully before committing themselves to another illegal military adventure in the Middle East.
Justin Glyn SJ is studying for the priesthood. Previously he practised law in South Africa and New Zealand and has a PhD in administrative and international law.