I previously noted the opacity of the motives of the US and its allies in bombing Syria and the potential for their actions to unnerve the Russians in the light of previous fumbled efforts at regime change in the Middle East. The Russians now appear to have acted on those concerns, strengthening their base in Tartus, reinforcing their troops there and flying sorties against ISIS and, according to pro-Western sources, other enemies of the Syrian government.
As with the Western governments, the Russians are playing with fire. The risk of a misstep is high.
Given that NATO-Russian relations are at an all-time low, there is a chance of a Cuban missile-type crisis if aircraft belonging to the great powers were to fire upon each other by accident or design.
There is also the unpleasant possibility of the so-far limited air war turning into a rerun of the failed Afghanistan war if Russia felt driven by circumstances to escalate its involvement.
The Syrian government are no angels, and any more bombing raids on an already heavily bombed and traumatised population is unlikely to improve the situation for civilians. However, the American claim that the Russians have a poor record in this respect smacks of hypocrisy, given the US's admitted destruction last week of a Médecins Sans Frontières hospital in Afghanistan at the cost of 22 lives (despite prior knowledge of its co-ordinates and 30 minutes after radio requests to desist).
The Russian move therefore has most of the same moral problems as the Western intervention. On the other hand, Moscow's policy at least has the merits of legality, intelligibility and consistency. Syria has asked it to intervene (much as Iraq invited the US to assist its war against ISIS) and Russia therefore has a legitimate claim to be aiding Syria's self-defence.
The Soviet Union established its naval base in Tartus during the rule of Bashar al-Assad's father in the 1970s, and Russia has maintained that Assad, cruel though he may be, is the best of an unpalatable range of options (the others being anarchy, Jabhat al Nusra (a branch of Al Qaeda) and ISIS).
The US have argued that this is a false dichotomy and accused the Russians of directing their firepower against CIA-backed moderate rebels instead of ISIS. If true, this would suggest pinpoint targeting on Putin's part: only last month, General Lloyd Austin told Congress that just four or five such rebels remained, the others having been betrayed or surrendered to ISIS or al Nusra.
Russia itself has even better reason to fear violence from extremist Sunni elements such as ISIS or Al Qaeda than the US. Whatever one thinks of bloody Chechen conflict (which has smouldered on and off for over a century), it has recently acquired a strong religious tinge with ISIS boasting many members from the Caucasus, including one of its most senior leaders — Omar al-Shishani (Omar the Chechen). ISIS has also issued statements threatening Russia.
Indeed, failure to take Russian information in this regard seriously may already have led to tragedy in the West — the FSB (Russia's internal security service) had warned the FBI in 2011 that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev (later convicted of the Boston Marathon bombing) had links to extremist groups in Chechnya.
None of this is to say that Russia's intervention makes the Syrian conflict any easier to resolve militarily. We now have the US, Russia and various Gulf states backing different parties to the conflict with money, equipment and, possibly, troops. The Russians also seem to be playing a role in coordinating the pro-government efforts, recently establishing a joint command centre with Iran, Iraq and Syria.
Yet there are encouraging signs that Russia's intervention may have sparked a realisation among some parties that a military solution to the civil war is unlikely. None of the major powers is stupid enough to want a nuclear war — a real risk if a conflict between the various powers in the air over Syria were to escalate. A more inclusive diplomatic track aimed at a political settlement is therefore a real possibility.
One sign of this rethinking is that most of the Western governments have abandoned their insistence on Assad's immediate departure, and the Russians do not seem to be wedded to keeping him there.
It would be hugely premature to claim that a diplomatic solution is in sight — much will depend on the Syrian parties themselves. Nevertheless, it may just be that the Russian intervention (morally problematic though it be) has the effect of starting the serious search for one.
Justin Glyn SJ is studying for the priesthood. Previously he practised law in South Africa and New Zealand and has a PhD in administrative and international law.
Image: Aftermath of aerial bombardment by the Syrian government of rebel-held areas of Azaz in Aleppo governorate, 2012. Wikipedia commons