Last week Frank O'Shea pointed out that part of the reason that the $50 billion submarine deal passes underneath our intellectual sonar without being challenged is the brain-boggling amount of money which it represents.
For me, as an international lawyer, another klaxon which it sets off is the fact that defence spending goes relatively unchallenged despite the fact that it says much about a country's diplomatic priorities.
As the great military strategist Carl von Clausewitz put it in Vom Kriege (On War) 'war is merely the continuation of policy by other means'.
In this age of the terror of terrorism, however, we have unfortunately reached the position where, like a stage hypnotist, all a government (any government) needs to do is to say 'national security' and our collective eyes glaze over and our brain switches off.
The new budget has allocated $32.3 billion to defence to pay for everything from submarines to maritime patrol aircraft, air tankers and training aircraft, and promised to grow the whole defence budget to 2 per cent of GDP (from its present 1.92 per cent) by 2020. Some of these increases may be vital and it is impractical for an average citizen to do a line by line check of the accounts.
However, while we may not be able to challenge the books in detail, we should be asking basic questions like: who are we defending against, how will our big ticket spending items advance this and will they work?
Only then can we sensibly ask whether the money could be better spent elsewhere — especially at a time when the Abbott-Turnbull government has been preaching austerity and a reduction, or at best flat-lining, of government spending in most non-military areas.
Let us take the sub spend, for example. We are told by the Navy in its 2005 book, The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, that the roles of the submarine fleet include: intelligence collection and surveillance; maritime strike and interdiction; barrier operations; advanced force operations; layered defence; interdiction of shipping; containment by distraction; and support to operations on land.
"If Australia is buying such offensive weapons, against whom does it anticipate using them?"
It will immediately be seen that these categories are not only very broad but (with the exception of layered defence) generally offensive in nature. Subs are not much use in policing or peace-keeping roles either. The Navy's book observes laconically that '[t]he modern submarine generally has limited utility in undertaking constabulary or benign diplomatic tasks'.
Indeed, as expected, the examples of effective submarine warfare cited in the book all date from active wars (World Wars I and II and the Falklands War). That raises the obvious question: if Australia is buying such offensive weapons, against whom does it anticipate using them?
In the last 50 years or so, Australia has been engaged in offensive operations mostly at the behest of the United States (Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria). The US' main rival in Australia's neighbourhood is China. Unsurprisingly therefore, Australia's 2009 Defence White Paper appeared to suggest that China would likely be Australia's main challenge in the region (and that the US might be unable to assist Australia in its defence).
That, however, would be awkward to say the least since China also happens not only to be Australia's largest trading partner but also to have a vast submarine fleet (80 in service and ten under construction) against which 12 submarines would seem fairly insignificant.
Even leaving aside such sobering considerations, the government has already announced that the first craft of the new fleet is only likely to be operational in 2030. That makes it quite a hostage to fortune. Not only does this assume that a boat with 14-year-old technology will not be completely outclassed by its enemies by then but also that the enemies against whom it is designed to be employed (whoever they may be) will still be relevant.
The purchase of submarines raises diplomatic questions, too. If Australia knows who its enemies are, presumably these putative enemies have a fairly good idea who they are as well. How are they likely to respond to a purchase of submarines? By initiating military countermeasures? By exacting trade sanctions? By diplomatic reprisals? (In this regard, it is noteworthy that China is currently reported to be upgrading its anti-submarine warfare capability.)
These questions are vital, not just for military planners but also for anyone who is likely to be affected by Australian foreign policy (sadly, usually a poor cousin when it comes to electioneering) as well as those who want to know more generally how their tax dollars are to be spent.
Let me be clear: there may be good answers to these questions. However, the questions themselves have not even been raised in most media outlets. Answering them, however, would scarcely reveal state secrets (given that both the Defence White Paper and the Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations are public documents). It would also make for a much more informed public — especially with an election due.
Justin Glyn SJ is studying for the priesthood. Previously he practised law in South Africa and New Zealand and has a PhD in administrative and international law.