Ukraine, a site of conflict over many centuries, is once again the scene of battle. First thoughts must be with the civilian population and Pope Francis’ call for prayer is probably the most practical course for most of us far from the action. Unfortunately, while it is clear that there have been casualties, both military and civilian, on both sides, the fog of war makes it very difficult to say more. Each side is active on social and traditional media and so a clear picture of what is going on is hard to come by.
It should also be remembered that, since the current Ukrainian government took power in 2014, there has been virtually constant shelling in the East of the country with losses on both sides which have also been variously reported. We know, too, that there are also many people displaced on both sides and that Russia and Poland, in particular, have played the major share in hosting refugees. In short, this is a tragedy which is still unfolding at the time of writing.
In understanding the Russian invasion, therefore, it is important to avoid falling into easy memes like ‘unprovoked attack’. There are clearly good grounds for doubting the legality of Russia’s action at international law and it is also true that very few commentators expected a full-scale invasion to be launched. Nevertheless, this is not a bolt from a clear sky but an intensification of a conflict which began at least eight years ago — and possibly thirty.
As I mentioned in a years-old article at the start of this crisis, the rhetoric used by Russia to claim recognition of Crimea (and now, of the Russian-speaking areas in Eastern Ukraine) is identical to that used by NATO in the case of Kosovo. Great powers argue for self-determination when it suits geo-political ends, and against it when it doesn’t. It’s therefore worth having a look at the geopolitics that got us here.
In the thirty years since the Cold War, NATO has expanded over Russian objections, to the extent that it now abuts Russian territory. At the same time, the US has unilaterally withdrawn from most of the Cold-War arms control treaties. Open Skies, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, all have been unilaterally renounced. Russia had repeatedly objected to NATO expansion, most recently in diplomatic demarches sent last December but had received only the response that ‘if the Kremlin’s aim is to have less NATO on its borders, it will only get more NATO.’ Even before a tank or drone had crossed the border, swingeing sanctions had been imposed by the EU and NATO on the basis of the mere threat of a Russian invasion. Given that even maintaining troops on its own territory triggered sanctions, the Russian government may well have calculated that diplomatic approaches were unlikely, and there was little to be gained by restraint. At the macro geopolitical level, therefore, it is hard to find easy heroes and villains.
'At the macro geopolitical level, therefore, it is hard to find easy heroes and villains.'
Local factors likewise complicate the general picture, with a long-running insurgency in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in the east of Ukraine (noted above). After the violent overthrow of the elected government in 2014, pro-Russian rebels refused to accept this turn of events and declared independence. As mentioned in my previous piece, the peace agreement (the Minsk accord) which followed the subsequent Ukrainian assault has not held, with Ukraine vowing it would never implement it.
Since the current Ukrainian government took power in 2014, there has been virtually constant shelling in the pro-Russian Luhansk and Donetsk regions. As journalist and former diplomat Craig Murray notes, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, tasked with monitoring the Minsk agreements, reported increased shelling of the separatist areas by the Ukrainian army in the days leading up to the latest escalations.
The Russian recognition of the separatist regions, which came on 21 February, could be seen as something of a response to this, even if the scale of the reaction may not have been proportionate. Citing the Kosovo precedent of a right to self-determination in the face of mistreatment of the civilian population and an accompanying ‘right to protect’, Russia was echoing previous NATO excuses for interference with sovereignty — excuses which had received at least some support from the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on Kosovo.
While the eventual Russian attack had all the hallmarks of being organised long in advance (which cast doubt on its bona fides), another feature of the timing may well have been Ukrainian President Zelensky’s threat on 19 February to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed part of Putin’s pretext to invasion is the fear of Ukraine developing a nuclear arsenal itself (unlikely) or, more probably, stationing short to medium range US nuclear weapons in NATO-owned bases in Ukraine (such as the Ochakov naval facility on the Black Sea coast). We do not need to imagine what the response would have been had the roles of Russia and the US been reversed.
It will, after all, be remembered that many US lawmakers wanted to launch precisely the same kind of campaign in Cuba when that country acquired Russian nuclear arms in the 1960s. Back then, however, there were adults on all sides willing to do the hard diplomatic work of de-escalation and détente was a recognised phenomenon, rather than a dirty word. This seems no longer to be the case.
So much for direct military threats. While it is hard to claim international law justification for Putin’s claimed desire to ‘de-Nazify Ukraine’ (even though it is clear that certain elements of the Ukrainian army, including the Ukrainian National Guard’s Azov regiment, are avowedly Nazi in their ideology), it is equally hard not to notice the lack of similar outrage when the US (similarly claiming vital national interests) launched or assisted similar ‘shock and awe’ campaigns of ‘regime change’ in Yugoslavia, Yemen and, most notably, Iraq, none of which shared a land border with it. None of these interventions had UN approval either. It should be remembered that the only persons to be prosecuted in connection with Iraq were the whistle-blowers who publicised NATO atrocities. Indeed, Julian Assange still lingers — without charge or trial — in a British prison.
By contrast, the Western shock now seems to be precisely that a major military offensive has been launched in Europe by a non-NATO country. As to what happens next, much is likely to depend on how the next few days play out. It remains to be seen whether the Russian government (with the Soviet and US experiences in Afghanistan fresh in its mind) will want to occupy a hostile country and remain for any length of time in non-Russophone areas of Ukraine.
Whether it has more limited war aims, and whether more loss of life and potentially thermonuclear escalations can be avoided, however, remains to be seen. Both sides have now announced an escalation in their nuclear posture which should be a cause for much greater fear than it is — sadly, no-one seems to watch Doctor Strangelove anymore.
Fr Justin Glyn SJ has a licentiate in canon law from St Paul University in Ottawa. Before entering the Society he practised law in South Africa and New Zealand and has a PhD in administrative and international law.
Main image: A Ukrainian tank. (Andrew Burton / Getty Images)